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This paper provides an empirical study on the extent of network effects for mobile 
telecommunications. We specify and estimate a model of consumer demand for mobile 
telephone calls, to identify the extent of network externalities and to prove that, with 
network effects, the demand curve is not downward sloping everywhere but it has an 
increasing part, verifying empirically the existence of the critical mass of the installed 
base of consumers. In order to do that we use a panel data of the 30 OECD Countries 
from 1989 to 2006 for estimating a quadratic relationship between price of 3-minute 
cellular call and the installed base of subscribers; we find strong network externalities 
effects on mobile telephone market which drive the demand curve for this network good 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Telecommunications growth is one of the economic and social most relevant aspects of 
recent years. Telecommunications growth means an ever larger number of users 
operators, connections and services. It means more and more bandwidth and longer 
periods of network utilisation. 
Presently, the telecommunications sector is going through a revolutionary change. The 
rapid technological change in key inputs of telecommunications services and in 
complementary goods has reduced dramatically the costs of traditional services and 
have made many new services available at reasonable prices. Moreover, the sweeping 
digitization of the telecommunications and the related sectors contributed to the change. 
The underlying telecommunications technology has become digital and the consumer 
and business telecommunications interfaces have become more versatile and closer to 
multifunction computers than to traditional telephones. 
Digitization and integration of telecommunications services with computers create 
significant business opportunities and impose significant pressure on traditional pricing 
structures, especially in voice telephony. 
The telecommunication network is a typical one characterized by direct network 
externalities which play a fundamental role in the growth of this market (the concept of 
network externalities will be explained in Section 2). Economic literature showed that 
consumption network externalities could have an important implication for size and 
structure of the telecommunication market. Economides & Himmelberg (1995) define 
the concept of critical mass: the minimal non-zero equilibrium size (market coverage) 
of a network good or service (for any price); for many network goods, the critical mass 
is of significant size, and therefore for these goods smaller market coverage will never 
be observed. Once the critical mass is reached the network experiments an exponential 
growth. 
After the seminal article of Rohlfs (1974), and the influential papers of Katz and 
Shapiro (1985) and Farrell and Saloner (1985), the theoretical studies on network 
effects became more and more rich; but, empirical works in this area are still poor. 
Greenstein (1993) conducts the first research in that stream. He shows that compatibility 
with the installed base matters in the choice of the mainframe computer system. Gandal 
(1994, 1995), in order to test the hypothesis that the software markets exhibit network 
externalities, estimates hedonic price equations for spreadsheets and data base 5 
 
management systems finding that the consumer’s willingness to pay for software 
supporting a common file compatibility standard is increasing. Similar results are in the 
Brynjolfsson and Kemerer (1996) paper. Additionally, they find that a product’s 
installed base increases the price of spreadsheets. But those authors use a specification 
of hedonic price model which, in our mind, should be used in market with direct 
network externalities and not with indirect one, as in the network of spreadsheets.  
In the empirical part of the Economides and Himmelberg (1995) paper they estimate the 
demand for facsimiles in the U.S. over 1978-1991. The assumption that facilitates the 
estimation is that expected network size is a linear function of the past network size. 
Fulfilled expectations would then lead to a constant growth rate of the U.S. fax network, 
which is counterfactual and breaks the consistency of that structural model. 
Others structural econometric works concerning network externalities include Gandal, 
Kende, and Rob (2000) for the CD industry and Rysmann (2002) for the Yellow Pages 
market. These authors concentrate on the indirect network effect and estimate two 
interrelated demand equations, for software and hardware, to model the 
complementarities between software and hardware. 
While it is widely acknowledged that network effects are a key feature of 
telecommunications industries, and indeed that telecommunications networks provide 
perhaps the leading example of network effects, relatively few studies have analyzed the 
empirical importance and extent of network effects in the telecommunications market. 
Empirical literature on mobile telecommunications concentrates on determinants of 
growth and competitiveness of the industry neglecting network effects in general. The 
study by Bousquet and Ivaldi (1997) is probably the first one which tests empirically for 
existence of network effects in the fixed-line telecommunications; the concept of 
network externality they use relies on received calls, which benefit subscribers without 
paying for them, rather than on installed base of subscribers. Next, Okada and Hatta 
(1999) specify demand for fixed-line and mobile telephone service adopting an Almost 
Ideal Demand System. They show that the number of mobile subscribers, as a quality 
measure for telephone service, has significant positive effect on share of 
telecommunications’ expenditures – both mobile and fixed-line – in households’ 
budgets. This result is an empirical evidence of network effects in demand for telephone 
service. Kim and Kwon (2003) show that consumers prefer mobile service providers 
with larger number of subscribers because of the intra-network call discounts and 
quality signaling effect. Directly related to our research is  the study from Doganoglu 6 
 
                                                
and Grzybowski (2005) on network effects in the German mobile telecommunications 
market. They estimate a system of demand function for mobile subscribers in Germany 
in the period from January 1998 to June 2003 and find that network effects played a 
significant role in the diffusion of mobile services in Germany.  Grajek (2003) specifies 
a structural model of demand for mobile telephone service and estimate this model for 
the Polish mobile telephone industry using quarterly panel data for the period 1996-
2001; he provides empirical evidence on the extent of network effects and compatibility 
between networks in mobile telecommunications finding strong network effects, which 
give rise to upward-sloping demand, and, despite full interconnection of the mobile 
telephone networks, low compatibility.   
This paper aims to contribute in filling the gap of the empirical literature by providing 
empirical study on the extent of network effects from mobile telecommunications. We 
specify and estimate a model of consumer demand for mobile telephone calls, for 
identifying the extent of network externalities and for proving that, with network 
effects, the demand curve is not downward sloping everywhere but it has an increasing 
part; this allows us to verify empirically the existence of the critical mass of the 
installed base of consumers. 
This is one of the very few panel empirical analysis on the network externalities effects; 
it uses the variables in the World Telecommunication/ICT indicators database of 30 
OEDC Countries from 1989 to 2006.  
We estimate a dynamic panel data model using the one-step and two-step Arellano-
Bond GMM estimator. 
Under the hypothesis that the best proxy for the future installed base of the mobile 
telephone network is the past installed base, we estimate the network externality effect. 
Moreover, we estimate a quadratic relation between the price of 3-minute cellular call 
and the mobile cellular subscribers and we find that for the mobile telephone network a 
positive critical mass exists
1. 
This paper wants to enrich the poor empirical literature on network externalities effect, 
analyzing the market where probably these network externalities are more present. 
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we define the network externalities and 
their source in TLC market; in Section 3 provide a brief description of the fixed and 
 
1 It should be interesting to see if the same result holds for fixed telephone call. We think probably it 
doesn’t, because the network externality effect has been undone by the price regulation of the fixed 
telephone market. 7 
 
                                                
mobile telephone market; in Section 4 we make a descriptive analysis and in Section 5 
we present the empirical analysis and the results; Section 6 provides the concluding 
remarks and the lines for further investigations.   
 
 
2.  Network externalities and their source in telecommunication market  
 
The literature on network effects usually distinguishes between two types of network 
externalities:  direct network externalities and indirect network externalities. Direct 
network effects refer to the case where users directly benefit from the fact that there are 
large numbers of other users of the same network; that is, direct network externalities 
are generated through a direct effect of the number of agents, consuming the same good, 
on the utility function of agents themselves (through a creation of new goods that 
directly and positively affects the utility function of every participant to the network). 
The TLC network (fixed and mobile) is a typical one characterized by direct network 
externalities which, indeed, arises when the user can call a larger set of other users.  
Indirect network externalities arise when the value of a good increases as the number, or 
varieties of complementary goods increases: the addiction of new varieties of one type 
of components affects positively but indirectly the utility of all participants through the 
reduction of prices. More generally, most markets with indirect network externalities 
are characterized by the presence of two distinct sides which benefit from the 
interaction among them. Typical examples are the PC market and the credit cards 
network. 
The key reason for the existence of network externalities is the complementarity 
between the components of a network. There are several possible sources of network 
effects in mobile telecommunications. First, with rising number of users having 
subscribed to a network, it becomes more attractive for other people also to buy a 
mobile phone and subscribe to the same network. This is the “direct effect” as in fixed-
line telecommunications: consumers value the installed base of subscribers, because 
they can satisfy more communication needs
2. Second, network expansion drives the 
usage volume of people already using mobile telecommunication: we would expect the 
 
2 If the installed base of fixed-line subscribers is already huge, network effects could arise in mobile 
telecommunications when mobile customers can call the stationary numbers. However, short message 
service (SMS) – available only within mobile network – might help to generate the “traditional” network 
effects. 8 
 
                                                
usage volume of existing subscribers increases with the total number of mobile 
telephone subscribers. 
More recent economic literature (e.g. Granovetter and Soong, 1986; Becker, 1991; 
Lindbeck et al.,1999; Schoder, 2000) starts with the social interaction theory in order to 
show that another source of network externalities is a need of people to buy, consume, 
and behave like their follows; therefore we expect that consumption of mobile telephone 
service is influenced by such conformist behavior. 
On-net call
3 discounts offer another explanation for network effects in mobile 
telecommunications. Blonski (2002) call this effect as “endogenous network 
externality”: given that it is cheaper to call a mobile number from mobile telephone in 
the same network than from another network, larger mobile network implies - as before 
- lower monthly bill, hence higher attractiveness of mobile telephone service in general. 
 
 
3.  Description of the telephone market 
 
The fixed telephone market borns as a monopolistic one. The justification was the 
presence of economies of scale and of density which have leaded to a natural monopoly. 
This natural monopoly was a public one in Europe and a regulated one in USA. In 
Europe the market liberalization started in 1988; in USA it started in 1984 for the long 
distance communications and in 1996 (with the Telecommunication Act) for the local 
communications.  
The technology research and development contributed to reduce fixed costs and to shoot 
down the barriers to entry. This fixed telephone market has been always regulated, 
either with only one firm or with a plurality of firms,  to guarantee an efficient service to 
everyone, independently from their revenue.  
For the mobile telephone market the history has been different because there were not 
natural monopoly technology conditions but the number of firms in the market has been 
decided by the number of licenses offered by governments. 
During the early 1980s analog cellular telephone systems were experiencing rapid 
growth in Europe, particularly in Scandinavia and the United Kingdom, but also in 
France and Germany. Each country developed its own system, which was incompatible 
with everyone else’s in equipment and operation. This was an undesirable situation, 
 
3 On-net calls are calls made to the same network; off-net calls are calls made to other network. 9 
 
because not only the mobile equipment was limited to operation within national 
boundaries, which in a unified Europe were increasingly unimportant, but there was 
also a very limited market for each type of equipment, so economies of scale and the 
subsequent savings could not be realized. 
The Europeans realized this early on, and in 1982 the Conference of European Posts and 
Telegraphs CEPT, formed a study group called the Groupe Spécial Mobile GSM in 
order to study and develop a pan-European public land mobile system.  
In 1989, GSM responsibility was transferred to the European Telecommunication 
Standards Institute (ETSI), and phase I of the GSM specifications was published in 
1990, Commercial service was started in mid-1991 and by 1993 there were 36 GSM 
networks in 22 countries with 25 additional countries having already selected or 
considering GSM. Although standardized in Europe, GSM is not only a European 
standard. GSM networks are operational or planned in almost 60 countries in Europe, 
the Middle East, the Far East, Africa, South America and Australia. In the beginning of 
1994 there were 1,3 million subscribers worldwide. By the beginning of 1995 there 
were over 5 million subscribers. The acronym GSM now aptly stands for Global System 
for Mobile communications. 
Once introduced, mobile telecommunication in the US and Europe always was in strong 
demand. In the 1990’s the rapid and sustained growth rate was accompanied by 
profound changes in the telecommunications markets. What once was the usual way to 
call someone changed from using the telephone booth or a fixed telephone line to using 
a personal phone kept in the pocket or in the handbag.  
Using a phone increasingly meant using a mobile phone instead of a fixed, a change that 
started in 1993. Global mobile communication - in all EU member states - is subject to 
regulation by an independent national regulatory authority (NRA). For the broader 
market only the European Commission targets the wholesale market, hence the retail 
market is essentially a national market (EC, 2006). 
 
 
4.  Descriptive analysis 
 
Figure 1 shows the mobile cellular telephone subscribers from 1989 to 2006. The data 
come from the ITU database. The graphic in the figure is constructed by calculating the mean of the mobile cellular telephone subscribers for the 30 OECD Countries
4 in every 
year (from 1989 to 2006). Our analysis begins in 1989 because before 1989 the data on 
mobile subscribers (and price) were not available given the absence of the cellular 
telephone market. The exponential growth of this market started from 1993-1994, when 
the GSM technology replaced the TACS technology and when consumers started using 
mobile phone instead of fixed one. As the figure shows, after 1993-1994 the demand for 
mobiles began to accelerate drastically. In 1997 it exploded to more than double the 
previous year, and in the following years the same; in 2004 the installed base had grown 
to more than 30 million subscribers. 
 
 
      Figure 1 
Interesting is Figure 2 which shows the mobile cellular subscribers over the population.  
 
 
      Figure 2 
                                                  
4 The Countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxemburg, Mexico, Netherland, New 





The data speak for themselves: the fact that ‘everyone has a mobile phone’ is not very 
far away. Actually there are countries that have a market penetration of more than 100 
per cent because some individuals have multiple subscriptions, for example one at work 
and one for private use and temporary subscriptions in foreign countries. An important 
driver of demand is price decreases. Additional support to the strong market growth 
came from the Internet revolution and worldwide liberalisation, privatisation and 
deregulation of the telecommunication markets. The mobile phone has become a 
symbol of status and fashion, the use of a mobile phone is also a part of young people’s 
consumption style, incidentally to a large part paid by their parents (Wilska, 2003). 
The number of mobile network operators increased considerably as a result of two 
processes. The first is the liberalisation of fixed and mobile telephony which started in 
the 1980s; the second process is the incorporation and partial privatisation of the former 
incumbent public telecom operators in the 1980s and 1990s. As a consequence of 
competition, prices went down while traffic volumes increased.  
 
 
      Figure 3 
 
Look at the graphic of price
5 (Figure 3): price of 3-minute call has been sometimes 
growing sometimes decreasing as the installed base has been always increasing over the 
years (these are the nominal price; in the estimation we will use the real price).   
Figure 4 gives some interesting statistics about how the telephone network grew in term 
of installed base for the high income Countries (which compose the panel for the 
estimation) in five years (from 2000 to 2005). 
                                                  













5.  Econometric analysis and results 
 
The explosive growth of the cellular network during the 90s was fueled by both realized 
and anticipated increases in the size of the installed base. Consumption goods with 
network externalities are often characterized by the existence of a critical mass point. 
That is, an equilibrium market for the good does not exist unless the installed base is 
greater that a minimum level. This is a general feature of goods that exhibit network 
externalities and it can be observed in a variety of market structures. 
The theoretical model our work refers to is that of Economides and Himmelberg (1995). 
They  present a model which allows to infer the effect of network externalities on 
consumer purchasing decisions. They assume that network externalities exist and 
attempt to model their consequences. The model assumes that the net value of a network 
good to an individual consumer depends on that consumer’s income level, the size of 
the installed base, the price paid for it, and a random element that captures idiosyncratic 
tastes. For normal goods which do not exhibit network externalities, demand slopes 
downward; as price decreases, more of the good is demanded. This fundamental 
relationship may fail in goods with network externalities. For these goods, the 
willingness to pay for the last unit increases as the number expected to be sold 
increases. If expected sales equal actual sales, the willingness to pay for the last unit 
may increase with the number of units sold. Thus, for goods with network externalities, 
the (fulfilled expectations) demand-price schedule may not slope downward 
everywhere. In such markets, as costs decrease we may observe discontinuous 
expansions in sales rather than the smooth expansion along a downward sloping 
demand curve. The critical mass is defined as the minimal non-zero equilibrium size 
(market coverage) of a network good or service (for any price). The two authors argue 
that, for many network goods, the critical mass is of significant size, and therefore for 
these goods small market coverage will never be observed - either the market does not 
exist or it has significant coverage. The concept of critical mass formalizes the "chicken 
and the egg" paradox that logically arises in such markets, namely: many consumers are 
not interested in purchasing the good because the installed base is too small, and the 
installed base is too small because an insufficiently small number of consumers have 
purchased the good. Thus, consumers’ expectations of no network good provision may 
be fulfilled. However, for a range of costs, expectations of positive level(s) of sales of 
the network good are also fulfilled. Often, there are multiple fulfilled expectations equilibria. Consumers and producers can coordinate to reach the equilibrium of the 
largest network size (the Pareto optimal one). 
Economides and Himmelberg show that perfect competition, monopoly, and oligopoly 
of compatible goods exhibit the same critical mass size. Thus, in each of these markets 
the network starts with the same coverage and at the same marginal cost. The expansion 
of the network as marginal cost decreases follows slower rates for oligopoly and 
monopoly. 
Based on this theoretical model we construct a structural model of demand for mobile 
telephone service.  
We estimate two models, the first one to analyse empirically the extent of network 
externalities in mobile telecommunications and the second one to verify the slope of the 
demand curve for this network good; that is, to verify the relation between the price of 
the mobile calls and the base of subscribers and to see if in the telephone market 
network externalities play a role and if this market (network) exhibit a positive critical 
mass.  
Following Grajek (2002), we firstly estimate the equation 
 
          (1) 
  
The dependence of the installed base (called “base” in equation (1)) of cellular 
subscribers on the installed base of the past years grasps the network externalities 
effects
6. The hypothesis here is that the future (unobserved) installed base is 
approximated by the lagged network size: consumers care about the lagged network size 
in their decision about joining the network
7. 
We expect that the (total) effect of the lagged installed base on the today’s installed base 
be positive and the price effect (called “pi,t” in equation (1)) be negative. 
This is the first part of the analysis. The second part consist in the estimation of the 
critical mass.  From the theoretical point of view, this implies that the willingness to pay 
of consumers for the network good is upward sloping and, after the critical mass point, 
it becomes downward sloping: when the installed base is small, the positive effect of the 
                                                  
6 Grajek (1992) inserts in the estimated equation the square function of the lagged network size to catch 
its non-linear influence on the willingness to pay of the consumers, e. g., diminishing positive marginal 
network effect. We think that this non-linear effect of the installed base is key in the calculation of the 
critical mass and it should be most correctly put in the equation of the willingness to pay. See below.   
14 
 
7 In the estimated equation the lagged network size corresponds to the lagged dependent variable. network size expectation on the willingness to pay of consumers is stronger than the 
negative effect of the network size; as soon as the installed base reaches the critical 
mass, the strength of the two effects is reversed and the inverse demand function slopes 
downward.  
We can think of the price of the network good as an hedonic price, that is, as function of 
the installed base of subscribers, of the quantity of calls, of the coverage of mobile 
cellular network, and other factors (i.e., some sociological ones). We estimate the 
willingness to pay as a square function of the installed base of subscribers to grasp the 
non linear influence of this latter on prices and then, to verify if a critical mass point 
exists. 
Therefore, the second estimated equation is 
 
     (2) 
 
If a mobile cellular telephone market exhibit a positive critical mass point, we have to 
observe a positive sign of b1 and a negative sign of b2. We choose a log-log 
specification for the interpretation of the coefficient in term of elasticity
8.  
Since the paper focuses on the demand side of the market and, in particular, on the 
identification of the network effects, we make the realistic assumption of the 
oligopolistic competition in mobile telecommunication market.  
The data we used come from the ITU database; we take the values of the real prices of 
the 3-minute mobile calls
9 and the subscribers for the 30 OECD Countries from 1989 to 
2006. We start from 1989 because before this year cellular almost didn’t exist, as said 
above. We have chosen the OECD Countries because of the same evolution of the 
telephone market.  
Equation (1) shows a dynamic panel data model which we estimate by using the 
Arellano-Bond techniques
10. To balance the panel, missing values on price series were 
calculated with statistical methods.   
                                                  
8 We will describe every variable of the equation (1) and (2) in the follow. 
9 In the period studied, all providers used non-linear pricing in the form of multiple price plans, from 
which the customers self-select the most favourable one. A plan consists of a monthly fixed charge, a 
price per minute of usage and often includes some minutes free of charge. A usage price is further 




10 Linear dynamic panel-data models include p lags of the dependent variable as covariates and contain 
unobserved panel-level effects, fixed or random. By construction, the unobserved panel-level effects are 16 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
Firstly, look at the result of the estimation of equation (1) showed in table 1.   
The dependent variable is the Mobile cellular telephone subscribers (Post-paid + Pre-
paid), for Country i at time t; it refers to the use of portable telephones subscribing to a 
mobile telephone service and provides access to Public Switched Telephone Network 
(PSTN) using cellular technology. This can include analogue and digital cellular 
systems. This also includes subscribers to IMT-2000 (Third Generation, 3G). Given the 
compatibility of the different mobile operators in the same Country, we can consider the 
network size (the installed base) as composed by the sum of the number of subscribers 
of each network in every Country; this variable is called base(M). 
The real price we use as regressors are called “Price call”; “Price call” is the mobile 
cellular price of 3-minute local call (peak and off-peak) in US dollars, for Country i at 
time t. The price of a 3-minute peak and off-peak rate call refers to calls from a mobile 
cellular telephone to a mobile cellular subscriber of the same network
11. 
We control for the real per capita gdp in US dollar (called “GDP”) and for the 
population (called “pop”), both for Country i at time t.   
In equation (a) of table 1 the parameters were estimated by using a fixed effect panel 
data estimation (it is not a dynamic model); equations (b), (c) and (d) uses Arellano-
Bond GMM estimator. Equation (b) reports the coefficients of the one-step estimation 
considering the homoskedastic case. Only in the case of homoskedastic error term the 
Sargan test have an asymptotic chi-squared distribution; the chi-squared of the one-step 
Sargan test in the table reject the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restriction are 
valid, but is could be due to heteroskedasticity. For that reason we estimate the equation 
(c) with robust standard errors, and the values of the coefficient do not change. In the 
robust case we can compute the Arellano-Bond test for first and second-order 
autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals that is showed in the table 2: referring 
 
correlated with the lagged dependent variables, making standard estimators inconsistent. Arellano and 
Bond (1991) derive a consistent generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator for the parameters of 
the model 
 
where αj are p parameters to be estimated, xi,t is a vector of strictly exogenous variables, wi,t is a vector of 
predetermined variables, β1 and β2 are parameters to be estimated, vi are the random effects that are i.i.d. 
over the panel with variance σ
2
v and εi,t are i.i.d. over the whole sample with variance σ
2
ε.  
11 Given the compatibility of network in the same Country and among Countries, we can consider the 
price of 3-minute call from a mobile cellular telephone to a mobile cellular subscriber of the same 
network as a good proxy of the price of call from a mobile cellular telephone to a mobile cellular 
subscriber of a different network (even to a fixed telephone network). 17 
 
                                                
to equation (c), we reject the null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation in the 
differenced residuals but we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no second-order 
autocorrelation. First-order autocorrelation in the differenced residuals does not imply 
that the estimates are inconsistent but second-order autocorrelation would imply that the 
estimates are inconsistent. Since the rejection of the null hypothesis of the Sargan test 
may indicate the presence of heteroskedasticity, we perform the Arellano-Bond two-
step estimator to improve efficiency whose results are showed in equation (d)
12; the 
signs and the significance of the coefficients does not change but the two-step Sargan 
test says that we can no longer reject the null hypothesis that the overidentifying 
restriction are valid. For the equation (d) too, we compute the Arellano-Bond test for 
first and second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals that is showed in 
the table 2: we reject the null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation in the 
differenced residuals but we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no second-order 
autocorrelation. 
As expected the sign of the price coefficient is negative and significant in every 
estimation. It is interesting to compare the price effect on the installed base in regression 
(a) and (b). Equation (a) assumes no network effect in demand for mobile telephone; 
equation (b) does it. The price effect in (b) is smaller than in (a) because of the network 
effects. Looking at the coefficient of the lagged installed base (base(M)), we can notice 
that network effects are present and highly significant; the total network effect (β1 + β2 
+ β3) is positive meaning that effectively consumers care about the installed base of 
subscribers in their decision of joining the telephone network. The effect of the GDP 
and population is positive and significant. 
Table 3 shows the results of the estimation when the dependent variable is the fixed + 
mobile phone subscribers (called base(T)); we specify this dependent variable because 
with a cellular phone one can call either mobile or fixed phones. The same result holds 
considering both the mobile and the total installed base
13. 
In table 4 we report the Arellano-Bond test for first and second-order autocorrelation in 
the first-differenced residuals relatives to equation (c) and (d) of table 3: we reject the 
null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation in the differenced residuals but we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation. 
 
12 Arellano and Bond recommend using the one-step estimator for inference on the coefficients because 
the two-step standard errors tend to be biased downward in a small sample. 
13 We can interpret only the sign of the coefficient of price and not its value because of the difference in 
the unit of measure between the price and the subscribers base, as one can see in the figures above.  18 
 
                                                
Table 5 shows the results of the estimation of equation (2).  
Look at the variables we used.  
ln(Pcall)i,t is the natural logarithm of the “price call” as defined above. ln(q)i,t is the 
natural logarithm of the number of mobile telephone calls. We didn’t find this data on 
the ITU database, but we derived it from the Revenue from mobile communication in 
US dollar
14. 
ln(base(M))i,t is the natural logarithm of the base (M) as defined above. 
We introduce a lag of the dependent variable and we control for the natural logarithm of 
the real per capita gdp in US dollar (called ln(GDP)). Since we focus on the 
identification of network effects, we restrict pricing behaviour of the providers by 
assuming that competition in the mobile telephone industry results in setting equal 
hedonic prices across brands over time for every Country. This assumption seems 
natural, as consumers’ preferences are not brand specific. As a consequence, in each 
instance of time consumers are indifferent toward brands. 
The error term is interpreted as the mean value of consumer’s valuations for unobserved 
product characteristics, such as product quality, etc.  
To estimate the dynamic equation (2) we use the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator.  
Look at the results in table 5. We present different estimation. In equation (a) there is 
not the ln(q)i,t and the estimations are robust. In equation (b), (c) and (d), ln(q)i,t is 
treated as an endogenous variable; we introduce one lag of this variable. The chi-
squared of the Sargan test in equation (b) reject the null hypothesis of overidentifying 
restrictions, then we estimate equation (c) with robust standard errors and equation (d) 
by the two-step Arellano-Bond estimator; the corresponding Sargan test is reported (in 
equation (d) we cannot reject the null hypothesis), and table 6 shows the Arellano-Bond 
test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors: we reject the null hypothesis of 
no first-order autocorrelation in the differenced residuals but we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation.  
 
14 Revenue from mobile communication is the revenues from the provision of all types of mobile 
communications services such as mobile cellular, private trunked radio and radio paging. We derive the 
number of telephone call by dividing this revenue for prices of 3-minute call. Then this is just a proxy of 
the quantity of calls. 19 
 
                                                
Equation (e) present an estimation using as regressor the natural logarithm of the total 
base of subscribers, which we called ln(base(T), instead of ln(base(M))
15. In every 
equation the coefficient are highly significant.  
The estimation of the coefficient of the installed base of subscribers shows that a critical 
mass point in the mobile TLC market exists. Indeed, the coefficient of ln(base(M)) is 
positive and the coefficient of [ln(base(M))]
2 is negative meaning that the (natural log 
of the) inverse demand function for this network good slopes upward and, once a 
critical mass is reached, it slopes downward. The same results holds if we consider the 
natural logarithm of the total base of subscribers (ln(base(T)). When the installed base 
of cellular phone subscribers is small, the positive effect of network externalities on the 
willingness to pay of consumers is strong and the demand function slopes upward; once 
the critical mass point is reached, the negative effects of a huge installed base on the 
willingness to pay emerges leading the demand function for the “telephone” good to 
slop downward. 
The coefficient of the ln(q)i,t is negative and highly significant; if we take its inverse, it 
expresses the elasticity of the demand of mobile call with respect to the price of the call.  
The coefficient of the ln(GDP)i,t is the elasticity of price with respect to the per capita 
income; it is positive and significant, meaning that if the per capita GDP grows of 1% 
the price of cellular call grows of the 0,23% (taking the value in equation (a) for 
example).  
We showed that a critical mass point in the TLC mobile market exists, such as in other 
markets characterized by network externalities. Then, keeping in mind that when the 
network reaches the critical mass point, its growth is becoming faster, network good 
producers should have to adopt some strategies to influence the expectation on 
consumers about the future faster network growth to be able to reach the critical mass 
point as soon as possible.  
Using the estimated coefficient of the quadratic relation between the log of the price of 
call and the log of the installed base of telephone network (both mobile and total) we 
draw a simulated price only taking account of the network externalities effect on the 
willingness to pay of consumers. In order to do that we find the (log of the) price of call 
in this way 
 
15 For equation (e) we compute the Arellano-Bond one-step robust estimation. We insert in table 5 just 
one estimation with ln(base(T) as regressor because the result of all other estimation (as the Arellano-
Bond one-step and two-step estimation) are the same.   
   
and 
   
 
where ln(base(M))t (and ln(base(M))t) is the cross section mean (of Country) of the 
mobile (total) installed base of subscribers for every year (from 1989 to 2006). Figures 
5 and 6 present the simulation. 
 
    
     Figure 5 
 
 
     Figure 6 
 
Figure 6 clearly shows the slope of the demand function for this particular network 
good; the critical mass point is reached when the log of the mobile installed base is 
about equal to 17. 
Figure 5 shows that if price of call was function only of the installed base of 
subscribers, when this latter increases price increases (grasping the network externalities 
20 
 effect) but after a certain level of the installed base, the growth of price slows. 
Moreover, comparing the two figures at low levels of the installed base of users, the 
price grows more as the total installed base grows than as the mobile installed base 
grows, meaning that the network externalities effects are stronger when the installed 
base is wider. Clearly the price of call that we observe during the years are also affected 
by other factors than the installed base, as the quantity of calls, the coverage of mobile 
cellular network, some fashion factors, etc. 
It is also interesting to notice the level of the elasticity of price call with respect to the 
installed base in each Country. To do that we calculate the mean (per years) of 
subscribers (mobile subscribers and total subscribers) for each Country, we have taken 





See table 7 
Table 7     
  Elasticity base(M)  Elasticity base(T) 
Australia 0.106131493  0.018944796 
Austria 0.114363439  0.05015336 
Belgium 0.113792382  0.04484218 
Canada 0.106356531  0.001902109 
Czech Republic  0.113311977  0.052487118 
Denmark 0.118722845  0.058925513 
Finland 0.117796538  0.062169823 
France 0.094804244  -0.02434961 
Germany 0.089632137  -0.03847577 
Greece 0.112836021  0.040441323 
Hungary 0.115729781  0.058729237 
Iceland 0.15196416  0.170515225 
Ireland 0.123357003  0.081534651 
Italy 0.090311719  -0.02565574 
Japan 0.084858544  -0.05133373 
Korea (Rep.of)  0.096575072  -0.01222784 
Luxembourg 0.145336212  0.153632302 
Mexico 0.098196097  0.002508883 
Netherlands 0.10774139  0.02416608 
New Zealand  0.125586436  0.083120353 
Norway 0.119627734  0.067779078 
                                                  
21 
 
16 For example, the value of 0.106131493 for the Australia in the first column of table 7 is obtained as 
0.289+2*-0,0058*ln(base(M)). 22 
 
Poland 0.104609881  0.019577159 
Portugal 0.111735171  0.045782448 
Slovak Republic  0.124890761  0.088980367 
Spain 0.096785097  -0.00607472 
Sweden 0.111598929  0.036744222 
Switzerland 0.116784012  0.048322878 
Turkey 0.09904663  -0.00100354 
United 
Kingdom  0.091071052 -0.02845582 
United States  0.077225264  -0.0850554 
 
The column of “Elasticity (base(M))” has been obtained using the estimated coefficient 
of the regressor ln(base(M)) from equation (c) in table 5, while the column “Elasticity 
(base(T))” has been obtained using the estimated coefficient of the regressor ln(base(T)) 
from equation (e) in table 5. For every Country, the elasticity of “price call” with 
respect to mobile installed base (always positive) is greater than the elasticity of “price 
call” with respect to total installed base (where positive). The percentage variation in the 
price of calls is more sensitive to a percentage variation in the mobile installed base than 
in the total installed base meaning that the network externality effect is decreasing as the 
installed base becomes wider.  
 
 
6.  Concluding remark 
 
In this paper we construct a demand model to estimate the network externality effect on 
the mobile telephone network. We used a Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data estimation 
to prove that the network effects play a role in this market and that a critical mass point 
exists. The line of further research will be to see if the results hold when we enlarge the 
sample by including other Countries, for example, the developing ones, and when we 
use other variables to better specify the model (as the coverage of mobile network). 
Moreover it would be interesting to test the same model using data on fixed telephone to 
see if the network externalities effects on price of fixed call have played a role even 
under the regulatory regime of those prices.    
 
   Table  1  base(M)  (a) (b)  (c) (d) 

































































N.obs  540 420  420 420 
R
2 0,8      
Sargan test    chi2(130) =  

















  In parentheses of equation (a) are Student’s t-test values; in parentheses of equation (b), (c) and (d) are 
standardized normal z-test values. * significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 
10% level. Equation (a): fixed effects robust estimation; equation (b): Arellano-Bond one-step estimation; 
equation (c): Arellano-Bond one-step robust estimation; equation (d): Arellano-Bond two-step estimation. 
 
  
           Table 2 
   (c)  (d) 
Order  z  Prob > z  z  Prob > z 
1  -2.3047  0.0212 -1.8104 0.0702 





  Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors.  




 Table  3 
base(T)  (a) (b)  (c)  (d) 

































































N.obs 540  420  420  420 
R
2 0,7      
Sargan test    chi2(130) =   

















In parentheses of equation (a) are Student’s t-test values; in parentheses of equation (b), (c) and (d) are 
standardized normal z-test values. * significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 
10% level. Equation (a): fixed effects robust estimation; equation (b): Arellano-Bond one-step estimation; 











  Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors.  
 (c)  (d) 
Order  z  Prob > z  z  Prob > z 
1 -2.5843  0.0098  -2.0199  0.0434 
2 -.3125  0.7547  -.20002  0.8415 




   Table 5 



























































































N.obs 480 480 480 480 480 
Sargan test    chi2(252) =    
355.1507    chi2(252) =    
27.50719 
 
In parentheses are standardized normal z-test values. * significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; 
*** significant at 10% level. Equation (a): Arellano-Bond one-step robust estimation; equation (b): 
Arellano-Bond one-step estimation, the ln(q)i,t is the endogenous variable; equation (c): Arellano-Bond 
one-step robust estimation, the ln(q)i,t is the endogenous variable; equation (d): Arellano-Bond two-step 
estimation, the ln(q)i,t is the endogenous variable; equation (e): Arellano-Bond one-step robust estimation 











  Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors.  
 (a)  (c)  (d) 
Order  z  Prob > z  z  Prob > z  z  Prob > z 
1 -2.821  0.0048  -2.801  0.0051  -2.6694  0.0076 
2  1.4662  0.1426 .46038  0.6452 .41834  0.6757 
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